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r0 Duration (days) Final Attack Rate
Prevalence of illness 
at peak
# of iterations
Stage 1
5-95th percentiles
1.90
1.73-2.06
29.3
21.5-42.3
78.5%
71.8-83.2%
15.0%
11.2-19.6%
100
Stage 2
5-95th percentile
2.70
2.50-2.90
23.5
19.1-30.1
92.0%
89.9-93.7%
22.0%
18.2-26.6%
100
Stage 3 models
Good:Bad advice ratio is 60:40
5-95th percentile range
1.78
1.63-1.95
28.3
21.1-37.6
74.7%
68.5-80.5%
15.3%
10.9-19.7%
100
Good:Bad advice ratio is 80:20
5-95th percentile range
0.96
0.85-1.06
13.8
11.6-17.1
17.9%
9.3-27.3%
5.4%
2.4-8.9%
100
20% of agents are ‘immunised’
5-95th percentile range
1.80
1.61-1.92
27.6
19.1-36.2
75.2%
70.5-79.0%
15.7%
11.1-19.7%
100
90% of agents are ‘immunised’
5-95th percentile range
0.97
0.85-1.07
13.0
11.2-16.1
19.0%
10.6-27.7%
6.0%
2.6-10.1%
100
RESULTS. Stage 1 (no misinformation), stage 2 (outbreak exacerbated by bad advice), and 
stage 3 (testing intervention strategies against misinformation).  Mean values for given 
outbreak characteristics in multiple model runs, with 5-95th percentile range.
Note: ‘immunised’ means immunity against believing or sharing bad advice, rather than immunity against norovirus.
Research Questions: How could fake news change a disease outbreak?  What strategy could counter effects of fake news?
Design: Agent-based Model, many stochastic elements
Behaviour response: Reckless behaviour (physical contact, sharing food, not disinfecting or washing): increasing chances of catching disease.
Disease: Norovirus because it won’t cause panic or flight,(and it’s not flu).
How information spreads: Mostly within ‘bubbles’ of like-minded individuals (no direct contact required to share information)
How disease spreads: With direct contact between agents
3 model Stages: 1) no info spread, 2) info making an outbreak worse, 3) testing two strategies to counter misinformation (using multiple iterations)
RESULTS: Reduce bad advice from 50% to 40% of circulating info, or make 20% of agents non-responsive to bad advice -> outbreak is no worse than when 
no information was spreading.  But need drastic changes in proportion of good/bad advice to reduce r0 to < 1.0.
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Information Filter Bubbles.  
Which tribe are you?
Blue Green Mixed Pink
KEY MODEL PARAMETERS ASSUMPTIONS (most from literature)
1600 agents generated on a grid that measures 88 x 90 patches -> daily contact rate mean = 11.7 other individuals (enough contact to transmit 
disease).  Distribution into homophilous* groups that may overlap with other groups; spacing adjusted to achieve target r0.
*Homophilous with regard to predisposition to believe conspiracy theories 
Target r0 in no-information spread stage (1) = 1.9, found in literature on community norovirus outbreaks.
Everyone has own ‘bubble’ of contacts, size= 80-230 agents (“friends”, size distribution to conform with Dunbar numbers) to share info with; 
somewhat clustered near home address, somewhat clustered by tendency to reject establishment & believe in conspiracy theories (mean = 38% for 
British population)
Information shared to random small % of contacts each hour; exposure to good or bad advice can increase or reduce chances of taking precautions
Ratio of false: true information circulating = 4:1 (from real observations on Twitter) 
Likelihood of sharing information about disease: 3% for true information, 12% for untrue information (following sharing patterns observed on Twitter)
85% of information cascades have length = 1, <2% of cascades have length > 4.
Rate that new information is injected to community: 138 times/hour (resulting in 166 relevant cascades with length > 1, per day )
Taking precautions can mean washing hands, avoiding physical contact, disinfection measures, etc.
Chances of taking effective precautions: iteratively found best set to mean = 56.1% to achieve target r0
Change in likelihood of taking precautions: experimented with in model, needs to be small, change set to 7% for each information exposure in Stage 2 
model to achieve 40% increase in R0 over R0 in no-information exchange stage (1)
Incubation period & Infectious periods = 36 hours 
EXAMPLE mid model run.  White = susceptible and taking few precautions, Blue = susceptible but taking 
precautions.  Red = Infectious/no precautions, Magenta=infectious/takes most precautions.  Orange = 
incubating, Green = recovered.
